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Background: Increasingly, research supports the utility of a transdiagnostic
understanding of psychopathology. However, there is no consensus regarding the
theoretical approach that best explains this. Transdiagnostic interventions can offer
service delivery advantages; this is explored in the current review, focusing on group
modalities and primary care settings.
Objective: This review seeks to explore whether a Perceptual Control Theory (PCT)
explanation of psychopathology across disorders is a valid one. Further, this review
illustrates the process of developing a novel transdiagnostic intervention (Take Control
Course; TCC) from a PCT theory of functioning.
Method: Narrative review.
Results and Conclusions: Considerable evidence supports key tenets of PCT. Further,
PCT offers a novel perspective regarding the mechanisms by which a number of familiar
techniques, such as exposure and awareness, are effective. However, additional research
is required to directly test the relative contribution of some PCT mechanisms predicted
to underlie psychopathology. Directions for future research are considered.
Keywords: transdiagnostic, group intervention, anxiety, depression, primary care, control theory
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) oﬀers a range of highly eﬃcacious treatment protocols
targeting specific disorders, as evidenced by a substantial number of RCTs (Butler et al., 2006;
Hofmann et al., 2012). However, significant numbers of people do not receive evidence-based
psychological interventions for psychological problems (Shafran et al., 2009; Castelnuovo, 2010;
Hofmann, 2013); a “gap” between research findings and clinical practice (Shafran et al., 2009).
Various explanations for this gap have been considered including: clinician beliefs that manualized
treatments are not suﬃciently flexible for routine practice; insuﬃcient funding for training and
interventions; and lack of knowledge of how to best convey and assess CBT skills (Shafran et al.,
2009; Dobson and Beshai, 2013).
The plurality of disorder-specific protocols within the “CBT family” can provide challenges
in disseminating CBT and could contribute to the gap between research findings and practice
(Mansell, 2008; Dobson and Beshai, 2013; Hofmann, 2013). This provides an ongoing imperative
for the development of interventions that develop generalizable clinician skills and are eﬀective for
clients with comorbid problems (Shafran et al., 2009; McHugh and Barlow, 2010). Transdiagnostic
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interventions may facilitate this process by providing
interventions that are empirically grounded, but flexible to
deliver and disseminate (McHugh et al., 2009; Wilamowska et al.,
2010).
Firstly, this paper briefly reviews the rationale and empirical
basis for a transdiagnostic approach. Secondly, Perceptual
Control Theory (PCT; Powers, 1973) is detailed. PCT oﬀers a
conceptual underpinning for transdiagnostic CBT interventions
(Mansell et al., 2012). Thirdly, the PCT basis of a new group-
based intervention (Take Control Course; TCC) is presented,
including a PCT understanding of exposure and awareness
techniques. The TCC targets transdiagnostic processes and
therefore contributes to emerging research regarding how a
transdiagnostic theory can inform eﬀective interventions. Initial
eﬀectiveness data for the TCC is reported in full elsewhere
(Morris et al., 2015) and a RCT is currently underway. Both the
initial feasibility study and the RCT recruit from primary care
psychological services.
A TRANSDIAGNOSTIC APPROACH
Considerable research has identified transdiagnostic
maintenance processes across numerous disorders (Mansell,
2011; Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins, 2011)1. Deficits in
executive control, such as diﬃculties disengaging from a current
task, are also found across a range of disorders (Schultz and
Searleman, 2002; Fernández-Serrano et al., 2011). See Nolen-
Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) for a more detailed summary of
transdiagnostic processes.
Some interesting and promising transdiagnostic groups have
already been developed; for example, Barlow and colleagues
Unified Protocol has recently been delivered in a group-format
and Norton’s transdiagnostic anxiety groups are well-established
(Norton, 2008; Wilamowska et al., 2010; Bullis et al., 2014);
see Newby et al. (2015) for a meta-analysis of transdiagnostic
interventions. However, these diﬀer from the TCC in a number
ways. A key diﬀerence is that none of the previous transdiagnostic
interventions draw on PCT. It is advantageous to develop
interventions from diﬀerent theoretical perspectives so that
mechanisms of change can be compared and understood (Follette
and Beitz, 2003; Rosen and Davison, 2003). Other diﬀerences are
described in Morris et al. (2015) in summary:
The features of TCC, that diﬀerentiate it from pre-existing
interventions are: (a) basis in PCT; (b) no explicit emphasis
on challenging the content of cognitions; (c) briefer group-
based format; (d) explicitly flexible delivery mode; (e)
broadly transdiagnostic focus that targets generic mechanisms
(maladaptive/inflexible control and goal conflict). (p. 3).
One potential advantage of a transdiagnostic approach is the
potential to bring us closer to understanding the mechanisms
that underpin psychopathology, in light of increasing cross-
disciplinary evidence for common processes (Mansell et al.,
1Transdiagnostic maintenance processes are cognitive and behavioral processes
that contribute to the maintenance of symptoms of psychological distress across
a wide range of psychological disorders (Harvey et al., 2004).
2009; Pierre, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins, 2011).
Convergent evidence from neurobiological and cognitive-
behavioral research suggests that current diagnostic categories
do not precisely specify the factors that cause and maintain
psychopathology (Morris and Cuthbert, 2012). For example,
research has indicated that “genetic and environmental
risk factors for mental illness induce susceptibility to broad
domains of psychopathology, rather than discrete categorical
disorders, because they disrupt core connectivity circuits in
ways that necessarily produce transdiagnostic symptoms”
(Buckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012, p. 990). This
has resulted in an increased drive for understandings of
psychopathology based on mechanistic empirical data (e.g.,
Research Domain Criteria project; Cuthbert, 2015). The
emphasis on understanding mechanisms that underline
psychology seems a vital one in order to explain the converging
empirical evidence.
There is growing empirical support for the presence of
common maintenance processes, but there is much less
understanding regarding which theoretical account best explains
how and why these processes maintain psychological distress
(Harvey et al., 2004; Mansell et al., 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema and
Watkins, 2011). Traditional CBT accounts have been adapted
to focus on targeting processes across disorders (Norton, 2008;
Forgeard et al., 2011). However, it is argued that other accounts
(such as PCT) could also oﬀer a useful understanding of
how and why numerous transdiagnostic processes maintain
psychological distress across disorders. For example, PCT was
initially conceptualized as transdiagnostic because it was founded
as a framework for understanding psychological functioning
as a whole and so the suggested mechanisms apply across
all disorders (Alsawy et al., 2014). It provides a functional
model of how psychopathology arises and how recovery can
be facilitated (Powers, 1973). PCT is described as “functional”
because PCT is a theory from which actual working systems can
be constructed (see Carey, 2011, for greater theoretical discussion
of this and http://www.perceptualrobots.com for some practical
examples). PCT will be described in more detail in the upcoming
sections.
Further, PCT is a core process account; core process
accounts suggest that there are a few universal processes
that underlie psychopathology (Ingram, 1990; Mansell et al.,
2009). One of the challenges to transdiagnostic theories is
parsimoniously explaining why a plethora of maintenance
processes, such as repetitive negative thinking, perfectionism, are
associated with psychopathology. Core process accounts provide
a parsimonious way of integrating the relationships between
these processes (see Mansell et al., 2009, for a discussion of
other theoretical accounts that could integrate such findings).
Empirical evidence that there are universal processes that
underlie psychological dysfunction across disorders is currently
small, but is increasing (Field and Cartwright-Hatton, 2008;
Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Bird et al., 2013a; Johnson
et al., 2013). For example, a study in a mixed diagnostic
group found that the variance of a range of maintenance
processes was best explained by a single factor (Patel et al.,
2015).
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AN INTRODUCTION TO PERCEPTUAL
CONTROL THEORY (PCT)
The following sections introduce PCT, and summarize relevant
research examining basic principles. Research supporting key
aspects in clients experiencing psychological distress is also
summarized. Key terms are summarized in Table 1.
Living is Control
The tenet that perception is controlled by behavior (rather than
behavior that is controlled) is a particular emphasis of PCT
(Marken and Mansell, 2013). Control is an ongoing process
of comparing current perception against an internal goal or
standard, and acting to minimize discrepancies. See Figure 1
for the closed “negative feedback” loop that is the basic unit of
control within PCT. A full pathway round such a closed loop
is necessary to implement control of perception by behavior.
Even when a stimulus is subliminally presented it will seem
that a stimulus triggers a response, when in fact a control
system always acts against disturbances in the environment to
minimize a discrepancy. For example, a socially anxious person
who wishes to keep a long interpersonal distance away from
other people during a conversation will be regularly moving
forward or backward to maintain this distance without needing
to be aware of every movement of the person they are talking
to. Therefore, there is greater acknowledgment of feedback
processes within PCT than in traditional stimulus response
models, whereby processing a stimulus triggers an observable
behavior and no feedback process to regulate goal states is
explicitly implicated.
As a simplified version of the “negative feedback” loop, three
essential aspects enable living beings to make events happen the
way they want (control), which are perception, comparison, and
action (Powers, 1973). These processes are specified precisely in
terms of mathematical equations that can be used to model these
relationships (Marken, 2009). Perception refers to perceiving the
current experience or situation, comparison refers to assessing
the current experience against an internal standard, and then
the ability to act refers to acting on the environment to
make what is being perceived to match the internal standard.
Current perception is constantly compared to internal standards
and actions occur to minimize any discrepancies from these
standards. For example, in a noisy café a person will speak at
a particular volume to make themselves heard, if a noisy group
leaves they will reduce their voice so that it does not appear
too loud. The reduction in volume occurs because the voice
they hear (perceive) has become diﬀerent from their standard
for “acceptable volume” (compare) and they decrease volume to
reduce the discrepancy (act).
Research using computerized tracking tasks has provided
evidence for the proposition that perception is controlled
through action. Tasks involve participants keeping a pointer lined
up with a target while the computer program randomly moves
the pointer around. Such tasks require participants to keep the
pointer “on target” and use their actions to dynamically alter
their trajectory when the movements of the computer program
take them away from their goal. A number of studies have
found that what is being controlled is the perception of keeping
the marker aligned rather than the behavior of moving the
mouse (e.g., Marken et al., 2013; Marken, 2014). These tasks are
an analog of everyday control, such as keeping a comfortable
TABLE 1 | Summary of key Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) terms used.
Term Definition Example
Reference values or goal Internal standard that is based on genetic predisposition
and/or past experience.
Reference values can be considered as a set of personal “just rights”. There
is a huge range of possible examples, from reference values for a good cup
of coffee (e.g., milky but strong) to reference values for being a good person
(e.g., kind, honest etc.).
“Goals” and “reference values” refer to a broad range of
reference points that encompass values, beliefs,
schemas etc.
Control Keeping a perception as close as possible to a desired
reference value.
Being a caring friend; Keeping feelings of anxiety at zero; Living a good life.
Error (or discrepancy) The difference between the wanted and the experienced
reference value.
Feeling that have let a friend down by not being caring enough; Anxiety
experienced as more than can tolerate; Feeling of not living life as wanted.
Control hierarchy (system) Internal reference values that are arranged in a
hierarchical network.
Each individual will have a multitude of hierarchies. Higher-level goals (for
example, the self-concept of being successful) leading to the setting of
sub-goals for an individual’s principles (e.g., achieving at work), which in
turn regulate lower-level, shorter-term goals (e.g., working long hours).
(Goal) conflict The state when two control systems attempt to control
an experience with respect to two (or more) opposing
reference values.
Carey (2008) gives this example of a client who presented with depression,
indecisiveness and lack of sense of purpose. The client had a conflict
between reference values of a child self that is spontaneous and reckless
and a parent self that has duties. Both the “child self” and “parent self”
values would often apply to the same decision or behavior.
Reorganization When there is awareness of conflict between reference
values (or error) within an individual then the
reorganization process begins to make random
changes. Trial-and-error changes continue until the error
is reduced.
A shift in perspective, or “aha moment”, during the therapy process (or
outside of therapy) could indicate that reorganization has successfully
occurred (Gianakis and Carey, 2011). For example, to return to the client in
the goal conflict example, once this client becomes aware of the conflict
between child and parent selves they could realize one self better fits certain
contexts (such as the parent self at work).
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FIGURE 1 | A model of the closed negative feedback loop described in PCT; definitions of key components are included within the diagram [Redrawn
by Dag Forssell from a diagram by William T. Powers].
interpersonal distance or moderating the loudness of speech.
Evidence supporting the tenet that perception is controlled by
behavior, and other tenets of PCT, has been further reviewed
elsewhere (Grawe, 2007; Pellis and Bell, 2011; Marken and
Mansell, 2013).
One significant challenge to the fundamental tenet that
behavior is a process of controlling perception is from studies
that could indicate that behavior occurs in the absence of
perception, i.e., organisms producing behavioral results without
perception of these results. Such studies involve participants
who do not have nerve feedback from touch and proprioception
(Mechsner et al., 2007). Therefore, when visual feedback is
removed, movement behaviors are conducted in the absence
of the majority of the perceptual feedback normally utilized.
However, it is suggested within these studies that perception
of these behaviors may still be a controlled process, relying on
visual imagery (internal perception) or memory of the behavior
(Mechsner et al., 2007; Guillaud et al., 2011). Further research
is required in order to test whether participants are producing
controlled results without perception and to establish whether
these studies do undermine a fundamental tenet. The interested
reader is directed toward Taylor (1999) for a summary of a
number of objections directed at PCT and how these can be
addressed.
Loss of Control is a Cause of Distress
A central tenet of PCT is that well-being involves maintaining
control over one’s life, and, that psychological distress represents
loss of this control. The associations between lack of control
over external events and psychological distress have been
extensively reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Chorpita and Barlow, 1998;
Forgeard et al., 2011). For example, research suggests that early
experience of loss of control contributes to anxiety/depression
(Chorpita and Barlow, 1998; Suárez et al., 2009). Perceived
loss of control of teenagers and adolescents has been shown
to mediate the relationship between family environment (e.g.,
communication, behavioral control) and anxiety (Ballash et al.,
2006; McLeod et al., 2007; Nanda et al., 2012). Research
also indicates that the inability to influence internal events
(e.g., thoughts, feelings, impulses) is related to psychological
distress, including anxiety and depression (Dell’Osso et al., 2006;
Teachman et al., 2012). Overall, substantial research supports
the principle that loss of control is associated with psychological
distress.
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In line with this research, the “loss of control” described
in PCT can be over external or internal events; this refers to
a state whereby an individual’s perceptions are not suﬃciently
close to their reference value (or desired standard). For example,
they are worrying much more than they want (more than
their standard for an acceptable level of worry). Whether an
individual reports they have lost control, i.e., their perceived
level of control, may vary. Commonly, when individuals access
therapy they are aware that aspects of their experience are
not as desired and this can be described in terms of “loss
of control”. However, there will also be instances whereby an
individual does not perceive they have lost control and they
have (or vice versa); an example of the former would be
someone who describes being in control of their expression of
anger when they commence therapy, but later realizes that this
level of anger conflicts with an important goal of maintaining
a loving relationship with their partner (this understanding
is further detailed in later sections on the role of conflict
and awareness). The inability to influence undesired external
and internal events is more likely to lead to actual (and
perceived) loss of control, as individuals will be less able to bring
their experience in line with their desired standard. Multiple
conceptualizations of control exist within the extant literature;
for example, in the mid-1990s over 100 uses of control were
identified within the psychological literature (Skinner, 1996).
PCT provides an operational definition of control, which is based
on a functional theoretical explanation of the mechanisms of
control.
One specific example of the loss of control experienced
within psychopathology is loss of control of emotions, i.e., an
individual perceiving that their emotional experience is not as
desired. A number of accounts, including PCT, suggest that
“negative” emotions arise in response to perceiving stimuli
(internal or external) in order to prepare the individual for
action and to meet a goal (Boudreaux and Ozer, 2013)2.
Further, it has been suggested and evidenced elsewhere that
negatively valenced emotions endure when progress toward a
goal is impeded (Carver and Scheier, 1998, 2013; Powers, 2005,
2008b). In accordance with this, a PCT model specifies that
these negative emotions arise when there is error within the
control system (Carey, 2011). Error refers to the signal within
the individual that something is discrepant, i.e., when a conflict
between goals is experienced. Negative emotions endure when
the goal is not (or cannot be) pursued and the error is not
corrected (Carey et al., 2014a), i.e., at times of loss of control.
Therefore, ongoing negative aﬀect and anxiety indicate a loss
of control, as they occur when error persists and goals are not
obtained.
Control is Managed Over Many Levels
A number of psychological theories have conceptualized the
human mind as being organized hierarchically (e.g., Trope
and Liberman, 2010). Grafton and Hamilton (2007) review
2The term “negative” is used here to distinguish emotions (e.g., anger, fear,
and depression) from emotions commonly described as pleasant and that do
not promote the same tendency toward action (e.g., contentment, equanimity)
(Powers, 2008b).
varied strands of evidence, including functional imaging and
computer modeling studies, to support the premise that complex
motor actions are organized hierarchically with respect to distal
goals. Uithol et al. (2012) review additional evidence and
conclude that the explanation most consistent with the data
is one that specifies dynamic interaction between the levels
of the hierarchy and that “elements higher on the hierarchy
are represented longer or are more stable than lower ones”
(Uithol et al., 2012, p. 1083). Such a conclusion is highly
compatible with a PCT account of the hierarchical structure of
control.
Although this evidence for hierarchy supports a PCT account,
PCT oﬀers a distinct account of the hierarchical organization of
control. For example, only PCT states that the output of each level
in a hierarchy is the reference value for what the level below in the
hierarchy should perceive (Powers, 1973). A higher-level goal of
“being successful” could lead to the setting of sub-goals, such as
“meeting work deadlines”; this in turn could lead to the setting
of lower-level goals, such as “stay late to work on an important
project” and to corresponding perceptual goals for motor actions.
A range of simulations have used hierarchical PCT-basedmodels,
from amulti-legged robot to human armmovement, and indicate
the functionality of this understanding (Kennaway, 1999; Powers,
1999, 2008a).
PCT proposes that humans have at least 11 levels of perceptual
organization (Powers, 1973). The highest of these are the
system concept, principle, and program perceptions. Program-
level perceptions describe programs of action, such as “brushing
teeth”. Principles are general rules that organize lower-level
perceptions. System concepts are sets of principles that relate to
more abstract values, such as self-concept and general values; for
example, “being a good person” (Powers, 1973; Bird et al., 2009).
System concepts may be somewhat analogous to core beliefs in
CBT, and similarly principles could be related to dysfunctional
attitudes (Beck, 1980; Bird et al., 2009; Dobson, 2009).
Conflict Undermines Control
An important cause of loss of control within PCT is conflict
(Carey et al., 2014b). Although conflicts between goals will arise
frequently, circumstances in which this conflict is enduring can
result in distress and psychopathology. Carey (2008) gives the
example of a client with anxiety, and possible PTSD, who has a
conflict between “wanting to let her daughter do normal things”
and “wanting to keep her safe”. One of the ways in which
wanting to keep her daughter safe manifests is a reluctance to
let her go out of the house; however, it seems plausible that
many parents would experience conflicts like this but would have
some degree of balance and flexibility regarding meeting these
goals.
Large numbers of studies support correlational and
predictive relationships between elevated goal conflict and
psychopathology, including relationships with depression,
anxiety, and negative aﬀect; similarly self-concordance (low goal
conflict) is associated with and predictive of well-being (e.g.,
Brockmeyer et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2015). Although overall the
relationship between conflict and psychopathology is supported,
a minority of studies has failed to replicate this, explained below.
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Conflict between Higher-Level Goals is
More Detrimental than Conflict between
Lower-Level Goals
A specific prediction of PCT is that chronic conflicts at
higher-levels will result in greater psychopathology than
conflict at lower-levels (Alsawy et al., 2014). The studies
that did not replicate the findings described in the previous
section (of a relationship between elevated goal conflict and
psychopathology) primarily measured conflict using methods
that involve participants explicitly quantifying the extent of
conflict between their self-generated goals (Kelly et al., 2015).
It has been suggested that the null findings are due to these
measures assessing lower-level conflicts that participants have
easy access to (Kelly et al., 2015). Direct evidence for the
greater pathological eﬀects of conflicts at higher-levels comes
from studies that indicate that higher-level conflict is particularly
problematic (e.g., Kelly et al., 2011).
It is also acknowledged that healthy individuals are able to
flexibly move their awareness up and down the hierarchy to
address both long-term and short-term goals, i.e., it is important
to implement higher-level goals via lower-level ones (Watkins,
2011). Flexible movement of awareness entails responding
to the contextual demands of diﬀerent circumstances, i.e.,
the employment of most appropriate level within the goal
hierarchy to meet the current task demands. For example,
in circumstances where a relatively concrete goal is being
pursued (such as, meeting a particular friend), but the goal
is currently unobtainable then a higher-level focus (e.g.,
having social contact) will be more adaptive than a lower-
level focus because this enables greater flexibility. Watkins
(2011) provides a useful account of circumstances in which
diﬀerent levels of goal identification are predicted to be
adaptive/maladaptive. However, he focuses on the dimension
of abstraction, whereas PCT would suggest that diﬀerent levels
of goals can be functionally diﬀerent on other dimensions.
A greater level of abstraction often characterizes higher-levels,
but there are other diﬀerences, such as the highest levels
taking longer to process than the lowest levels (Marken et al.,
2013).
Control without Awareness can
Exacerbate Conflict
As mentioned above, measures of implicit goal conflict are more
consistently related to psychopathology than measures of explicit
goal conflict (Kelly et al., 2015). A PCT account proposes that
this is because without awareness of conflicted goals, i.e., when
goals are implicit and less consciously accessible, conflicts will
not be resolved. When a reference value (or goal) is controlled
for without taking into account another reference value that is
also controlling this experience, this is described as arbitrary
control (Powers, 1973). For example, after a traumatic accident an
individual might experience sleep problems and flashbacks and
want to discuss this with others. However, they might struggle
to talk about these experiences due to a reference, which they
are not aware of, “other people will think I’m crazy”. Without
awareness of this reference their experience is likely to be of loss
of control and by not discussing their problems an important goal
is blocked.
Due to the importance of awareness in resolving goal
conflict, and meeting important goals, processes that limit such
awareness will maintain psychopathology. Therefore, repeated
and prolonged employment of processes (e.g., worry and
rumination), which limit attention and disrupt awareness of
goal conflict, promote on-going diﬃculties (Watkins, 2008).
It should be noted that it is the extent to which these
processes prevent the achievement of other goals that determines
whether these are maladaptive. There is some evidence that
processes/strategies that maintain psychopathology (such as,
rumination or suppressing emotions) are applied more rigidly
than “adaptive” strategies (Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).
Further, to focus on the example of rumination, research
has found that a form of “rumination”3 can have adaptive
consequences (Watkins, 2008; Ottaviani et al., 2013). Evidence
suggests that it is when rumination involves abstract evaluative
thoughts regarding the self and emotions, particularly when it
is negatively valanced, that it is maladaptive (Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008; Watkins, 2008). Arguably it is this type of
“rumination,” rather than a non-evaluative conceptual focus on
present experience, that is more likely to limit awareness and
constitute arbitrary control. This can be compounded when an
individual feels unable to control their thinking (Morris and
Mansell, in preparation; Teachman et al., 2012; Ottaviani et al.,
2013). This understanding corresponds with the wider literature
on control and self-regulatory theories (e.g., Pyszczynski et al.,
1987; Carver and Scheier, 1998), although a PCT account diﬀers
in some important respects (the emphasis on the role of conflict,
specification of a reorganization mechanism). Cognitive and
behavioral inflexibility has been associated with psychopathology
in a number of studies across disorders (Kashdan and Rottenberg,
2010).
Change is Spontaneous but its Focus is
Guided by Awareness
Change is often conceptualized as a linear process that occurs
over a certain number of therapy sessions; for example, clients are
often oﬀered a set contract (e.g., 6 or 12 sessions) and are assessed
for symptom reductions at the end of these. However, there is
accumulating evidence that change does not always occur in
such a predictable way with evidence that clients can experience
sudden gains (sometimes described as insights, eureka moments
etc.), early in therapy, that can account for a significant amount
of their improvement (Aderka et al., 2012).
Therefore, a change mechanism is required that would enable
diverse experiences of change. The proposed change mechanism
is known as reorganization. When there is a loss of control (or
error) within the control system then the reorganization process
3Sometimes rumination is defined in terms of repetitive negative, abstract, self-
focused thinking and this construct is associated with depression and negative
aﬀect Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008. However, it is noted that in clinical settings
clients do not always describe this experience with such specificity. It is more
common to talk about experiences, such as “dwelling on things,” which can refer to
a broader processes of self-reflection that may have adaptive as well as malaptive
functions.
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begins to make random changes, until the error is reduced
(Powers, 1973). The reorganization system responds to error,
it does not require volitional control. It functions in the same
way as other homeostatic processes within the human body; for
example, an optimal internal temperature is maintained within
our bodies without us having to think about it. These changes
occur at the point that awareness is directed within the control
system. The clinical implications of this include explaining the
findings that sudden gains can result in lasting symptom change
because these would be examples of successful reorganization.
The functional eﬀects of this model, i.e., whether such a process
leads to eﬀective change, have been tested and confirmed using
computer simulations (Marken and Mansell, 2013). Support
for the proposal that reorganization is activated by error in
the system is provided by research showing that unconsciously
activated goals are more likely to reach awareness when goal
progress is obstructed (i.e., when conflict) occurs (Dijksterhuis
and Aarts, 2010).
Shifting Awareness to the Systems Driving
Enduring Higher-Level Conflicts is the Key
to Recovery
Within PCT, it is proposed that it is vital for long-term recovery
that reorganization occurs at the source of the goal conflict(s)
(Alsawy et al., 2014). Reorganization occurs at the point that
awareness is directed and, therefore, bringing awareness to
enduring conflicts is vital to recovery (Marken and Carey, 2014).
Initial support for the proposal that reorganization promotes
psychological change, and “follows” awareness, comes from
research demonstrating that greater awareness of conflict
and higher-level processes during a psychological intervention
predicted greater distress reduction and problem resolution
(Gaﬀney et al., 2013). In a clinical sample accessing PCT-
based individual therapy, research has found that participants’
scores on a self-report measure of reorganization processes was
negatively associated with depressive symptoms and increased
following therapy, eﬀect size d = 1.11 (Bird, 2013).
According to PCT, the primary reason for using
awareness/mindfulness techniques, i.e., techniques that develop
sustained non-reactive attention, is to develop a “window”
of awareness that can be brought to bear on conflicted goals.
Eﬀective therapies use various methods to shift and sustain
awareness on sources of goal conflict (Carey, 2011; Higginson
et al., 2011). Given that this is a shared aspect of psychological
therapies, targeting this aspect will resemble facets of other
therapies; for example, motivational interviewing promotes
awareness of competing goals (Miller and Rose, 2009). But
the explicit emphasis on processes, such as control, hierarchy,
and reorganization, in the TCC result in diﬀerences (see
“Components of the TCC”). There is convergent evidence
that techniques that involve shifting and sustaining awareness
lead to significant psychological change (Carey, 2011; Fjorback
et al., 2011). It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a
comprehensive account of theories of exposure and mindfulness.
An individual CBT therapy has been developed based on
PCT; called Method of Levels (MOL) (Carey, 2006). This aims
to help clients to become aware of higher-level goals and
facilitate the process of reorganization, in order to resolve goal
conflicts (Carey et al., 2009). There have been a number of
evaluations of MOL in routine clinical practice trials. These have
shown significant post-treatment reductions in symptoms on
standardized measures of psychological distress, with moderate
to large eﬀect sizes, for clients experiencing a range of problems
including depression, anxiety disorders and anger issues (Carey
and Mullan, 2007, 2008; Carey et al., 2009, 2013). A pilot
RCT was conducted in primary care (Bird et al., 2013b) where
MOL was compared to control (waiting list or regular CBT
treatment). Significant improvements were demonstrated on
ratings of anxiety and depression in both conditions at follow-
up, with larger improvements in the MOL condition for ratings
of anxiety. Although a promising individual treatment, a MOL
approach cannot be used with large groups. TCC is informed by
MOL and includes some similar treatment components, such as a
curious questioning style and an explicitly flexible delivery style.
Interim Summary
In summary, PCT gives a functional explanation of how
psychopathology develops across disorders and also indicates
how this can be resolved. As would follow from this, causal
accounts of psychopathology based on conflict between higher-
level goals are found across a variety of presentations, such
as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Pitman, 1987), PTSD (Carey
et al., 2014b), depression (Hyland, 1987), bipolar disorder
(Mansell, 2010), addiction (Webb et al., 2010), and dissociative
disorders (Johnson, 2009; Mansell and Carey, 2012). In the
next section, the potential service delivery advantages of a
transdiagnostic approach are explored, and the ways in which
PCT informs the TCC are described.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAKE CONTROL
COURSE (TCC)
Studies have indicated that as much as half of those seeking
treatment for mental health problems access primary care
services alone (Kessler et al., 2005), highlighting the importance
of cost-eﬀective and accessible interventions in these contexts
(Alexander et al., 2010). Although a substantial proportion of
clients accessing primary care have problems with depression
and/or anxiety, clients with a range of presenting problems are
treated (Glover et al., 2010; Barkham et al., 2012) and PCT oﬀers
an understanding of psychopathology relevant to this range.
TCC was designed to be oﬀered within primary care contexts.
Given that PCT is transdiagnostic theory it is hypothesized that
TCC could be adapted for other client groups. For example, if
oﬀering the TCC to clients with addictive disorders a number
of changes could be made. One change could be to the focus of
the session on “what blocks our control” (Session 2) and this
could focus on control of urges to partake in substances, e.g.,
by prioritizing other goals and increased awareness, rather than
on repetitive thinking (Webb et al., 2010; Fujita, 2011; Thomsen,
2015). Although PCT is a transdiagnostic theory, this does not
mean that there cannot be diﬀerences in the likely content of goal
conflicts within diﬀerent presenting problems. However, because
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such presenting problems would still be underpinned by self-
regulation diﬃculties resulting from goal conflict, much of the
intervention content used to address these conflicts would be
similar.
Transdiagnostic groups are reviewed elsewhere (Morris
et al., 2015). Although initial eﬃcacy and eﬀectiveness data
for transdiagnostic groups is promising (e.g., Norton and
Philipp, 2008), the groups available involve a significant time
commitment (e.g., 10 weekly 2-h sessions; Maia et al., 2013;
Newby et al., 2015). However, there is considerable evidence
that briefer interventions are eﬀective for clients with mild to
moderate anxiety or depressive disorders (e.g., Newman et al.,
2010; Richards and Borglin, 2011). Therefore, the TCC oﬀers a
briefer format (6 weekly sessions lasting an average of 1 h) and
has the potential to be oﬀered to large groups. Evidence that
psychological change can be achieved in primary care through
large group courses (White and Keenan, 1990; White, 1998;
Kitchiner et al., 2009) suggests that such groups should not
rely on participant disclosure and discussion. The TCC format
relies on experiential exercises, worksheets, videos, and facilitator
presentations. However, using the current TCC delivery model
(where groups range from 5 to 15) some discussion is possible if
participants wish. Distinctive features were described previously,
and Table 2 illustrates how the PCT basis results in diﬀerences
in the ways that principles are conceptualized and employed
therapeutically.
Protocol Development
The main development team for the TCC consisted of a
Clinical Psychologist (and academic), Mental Health Nurse (and
academic), Trainee Clinical Psychologist, and three Gateway
Workers (experienced mental health professionals). In addition,
frequent development meetings were held with a range of other
clinicians who worked, or had worked in primary care settings;
with further suggestions from a specialist in graphic media and
a number of academics working on PCT related research. After
the initial consultation and development phase, a pilot with
eight clients attending the service was run of the first TCC
session in order to obtain detailed section-by-section feedback.
The first session was chosen for the pilot because it introduces a
number of recurring themes and techniques. Some sections were
revised, or replaced, based on participant feedback. Formative
feedback was collected during the delivery of all subsequent
sessions.
Components of the TCC (Including the
Rationale Based on PCT)
In accordance with the evidence that change happens at a
diﬀerent pace for diﬀerent people there is a strong emphasis
on client self-direction and flexible control within the TCC
(see sections on “Conflict between higher-level goals is more
detrimental than conflict between lower-level goals” and “Change
is spontaneous but its focus is guided by awareness” for
background, or Morris et al., 2015 for a more detailed
summary). Furthermore, increasing evidence indicates that
oﬀering clients flexibility in attending psychological treatments
increases eﬀectiveness for services and is valued by clients (Carey
and Spratt, 2009; Carey et al., 2013). It has been suggested,
that in clinical practice clients regulate their ongoing treatment
attendance and continue treatment until they have achieved a
“good enough” level of change (Barkham et al., 2006; Carey et al.,
2013). Providing flexibility of attendance and engagement could
promote attendance by promoting control and mitigating the
impact of internal conflicts that would block attendance (e.g.,
fears about emotional exposure; Schauman and Mansell, 2012;
Murphy et al., 2014).
Flexibility is oﬀered in other ways. Specific homework tasks
are not given, but at the end of each session participants reflect
on what they are taking from the session and can set themselves a
task. Sessional evaluation forms are filled in and session content
can be adapted in response to feedback. For example, although
the core content of each session is prescribed, certain techniques
re-occur and so later implementation of techniques can be
adapted in accordance with feedback. Furthermore, the emphasis
on experiential rather than didactic learning is employed to
promote individual clients to consider the specific ways they can
apply techniques to themselves.
Each session has a theme and includes videos of clients who
have accessed either previous interventions within the service or
earlier TCC. These provide opportunities for the group to hear
accounts of other people’s experiences of distress and recovery, as
relevant to the session theme. Some opportunities are provided
for participants to share their experience, but it is strongly
emphasized that this is not a requirement.
In accordance with the PCT theoretical account, targeted
throughout the TCC are: (1) understanding the process of
control, including the degree to which one can, and desires,
control over various aspects of one’s life; (2) awareness of valued
higher-level goals (and reasons for change); (3) awareness of
higher-level goal conflict; (4) encouragement of flexible ways
to control and reduction of processes (including rules, habits,
routines, and mental processes), that block valued goals. Clients
are expected to gain a greater understanding of the aspects of
their life that they can control, and ways of increasing control in
these areas. Further, the TCC enables clients to consider the goals
that are most important to them and provides ways of supporting
them to achieve these in a variety of contexts. The following is a
description of key components of the six sessions.
Session One: Thinking About Control
Control is the basis of this course. The overall theme is to
encourage participants to clarify what responses get in the way
of them achieving the things that are important to them and
to consider the things that they can, and want to, have more
control over. For example, one exercise uses a “continuum of
control” to facilitate participants to identify how much control
they have over diﬀerent aspects of their life. This group exercise
often promotes discussion regarding the diﬀerence between how
much control people think they have and how much control
they actually have. Other session components begin to oﬀer
techniques that promote sustained attention on problematic
experiences that are indicative of goal conflict. These include
an awareness exercise, which encourages clients to stay with an
experience and notice how this is diﬀerent from judging (or
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TABLE 2 | Key principles of PCT and examples of similarities/differences to familiar psychotherapies.
Principle/process Therapy
Take Control Course
(based on PCT)
“Second wave” CBTa Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (based on RFT)
Mindfulness-based
Cognitive Therapy (using
ICS theoretical
perspective)b
Control Control as fundamental to
life; functional process to be
restored and refined [see
Table 1 for precise
definition]
Not emphasized, except in some
specific models [e.g., Hofmann’s
(2007) social anxiety model; Fairburn
et al.’s (1999) Anorexia model]
Control as problematic (especially
regarding internal processes); to be
reduced in therapy
Attentional control seen as
functional and to be
increased
Goal conflict Higher-level goal conflict key
source of distress and
psychopathology [see
Table 1 for definition]
Not explicitly emphasized, although
approach-avoidance conflicts are
identified in some models (e.g.,
Kimbrel, 2008)
Not explicitly targeted, but potentially
addressed through acceptance focus
Not emphasized
Hierarchy Goals are organized in a
complex and many layered
hierarchy; 11 layers have
been specified [see Table 1
for definition]
Core beliefs, dysfunctional attitudes,
strategies are organized hierarchically.
These represent distorted and
dysfunctional cognitions rather than
goals
Values and specific goals are
specified, but hierarchical
organization not specified
Nine interacting cognitive
subsystems are proposed,
some of which are
hierarchically arranged;
these are specialized for
handling a particular type of
information
“High-level goals”
or “values”
identified
Pertinent higher-level goals
identified through sustained
awareness on problems
[see Table 1 for definition]
Not explicitly emphasized. Concrete
goals for therapy are seen as
important, but often not specified in
the models used
Values identified through value
clarification exercises
Not explicitly emphasized,
but can be discussed in
regards to relapse
prevention
Reorganization
(and observable
indicators of this
process)
Provides a mechanistic
account of how change
happens, indicated by shifts
in perspective/ “insight”
moments [see Table 1 for
definition]
Cognitive reappraisal and schematic
change could be observable
indicators (but not mechanistically
specified)
Not specified Modification of affect-related
schema, e.g., reducing the
likelihood that mild
depression will regenerate
depressogenic schematic
models, could be
observable indicator
Awareness An index of the current
focus; reorganization occurs
at the focus of current
awareness
Not emphasized Targets cognitive defusion and
acceptance
Targets attention regulation,
acceptance,
decentering/reperceiving
(similar to defusion) etc.
PCT, Perceptual Control Theory; RFT, Relational Frame Theory; ICS, Interacting Cognitive Subsystems.
The purpose of this table is not to provide a comprehensive comparison of therapies. It is focused on PCT-relevant processes; for example, cognitive biases are not included because,
while these are fundamental to CBT, they are only significant in a PCT conceptualization to the extent they cause chronic higher-level goal conflict.
aSecond wave CBT refers to the models that emerged during and after the fusion of cognitive and behavioral therapies in the 1970s (Rachman, 1997).
bThere is not a universally agreed theoretical basis for Mindfulness-based interventions. Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) has been proposed as a theoretical account of
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy (Teasdale et al., 1995) and is included as it provides a detailed explanation of the ways in which interactions between cognitive and affective
processes contribute to psychological distress.
thinking about) that experience; and a goal-focused exposure
exercise that involves imaginal exposure to an uncomfortable
experience (e.g., social situation, a recurrent worry, feeling of
failure), but not one that will be extremely uncomfortable
(Carryer and Greenberg, 2010). Diﬀerent forms of both goal-
focused exposure and awareness techniques can be oﬀered in
nearly all of the sessions. Awareness techniques precede exposure
components to facilitate enhanced attention prior to exposure.
Session Two: What Blocks Our Control? Addressing
Negative Thinking: Self-Critical Voice, Worry and
Dwelling on Things
A key message is that individual thoughts, even negative ones,
are not a problem. Even worry, rumination and self-criticism are
processes that many people engage in without any adverse eﬀects
(Watkins, 2008). They are a problem only to the extent that they
get in the way of important life goals, or they limit a person’s
awareness of important goals and goal conflicts. Therefore, more
repetitious and prolonged negative thinking can be problematic.
Videos and metaphors are used to delineate potentially more
problematic thinking processes, e.g., recurrent negative worry
and rumination. Strategies are taught to help address thinking
processes that block control. For example, a form of problem-
solving that emphasizes potential goal conflict is oﬀered as an
alternative to thinking over the same thing repeatedly.
Session Three: Feeling in Control Short-Term vs.
Getting Control of Your Life
The principle that goals are organized hierarchically provides a
key basis of this session. A fundamental message of the session
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is that sometimes (not always) our attempts to control our
emotions, avoid distress or keep safe can actually get in the way of
us doing things that are really important to us. This encourages
clients to focus on their longer-term (higher-level) goals and to
consider prioritizing these over short-term goals that are getting
in the way. For example, a common short-term goal that can
prevent achievement of long-term goals is “I must avoid all
distress/anxiety”. One of the early components is a group exercise
that emphasizes the normality and functionality of emotions.
Later in the session, participants complete a worksheet to weigh
up whether examples of things that they do have short-term (e.g.,
make them feel better) or long-term benefits (e.g., move them
toward their goals); then consider if there is anything they would
like to change.
Session Four: Taking Control of the Things Around
You
A unique focus of PCT is that we are designed to control our
environment for our own purposes. There are many things in
our environment that we can change in order to make our world
more like we want it to be. However, there are also some things
that, objectively, we will have limited control over, such as other
people. The control continuum is re-employed to consider how
much control participants have over aspects of their environment
that are causing them problems. An important focus of the
session is consideration of control in interpersonal scenarios,
e.g., a discussion or argument. The importance of clarification of
higher-level goals during interpersonal scenarios, especially goals
that might be shared, is explored using examples; it is suggested
that these processes can help navigate arguments and discussions
etc. For example, if someone had a higher-level goal of “having
peace ofmind”, as well as a lower-level goal of “gettingmy partner
to clean up more” awareness of the higher-level goal could allow
greater flexibility in how the lower-level goal can be achieved
and could reduce the tendency to get caught in the detail of
an argument. Expressing a potentially shared higher-level goal,
e.g., valuing the relationship, could further reduce the escalation
of conflict by increasing shared ground. There is evidence from
sociological work that interpersonal conflict escalates quicker
than it is resolved (McClelland, 2004), hence the importance of a
flexible perspective to reduce initial disagreement. Furthermore,
studies have found that shared reference values are important to
reduce interpersonal conflict (McClelland, 2004).
Session Five: Building on Strengths, Qualities, and
Resources
The focus of the session is to encourage participants to recall the
strengths, qualities and resources they have, especially at times
when things are diﬃcult for them. The rationale behind this
session is that self-concept goals are higher-level ones (Mansell
and Carey, 2009). Psychopathology can arise when another
reference value remains in conflict with a self-concept reference
value; for example, “I must be strong” vs. “I am weak and
inadequate” (Tai, 2009). An example of a metaphor, used in this
session, is that of a tree, which needs water and sunlight and
similarly people need resources to grow. Another imagery-based
technique used in this session is participants creating an image
that represents qualities that they value and believe will support
them.
Session Six: Moving Forward: What Gets Me Stuck?
What Helps?
A general overview of TCC is provided. Clients are encouraged
to choose elements that they want to revisit. They complete a
worksheet regarding the things that are helping them feel in
control and signs that they are struggling. This worksheet has
similarities to a “relapse prevention” session in a traditional
CBT approach. Allowing choice in the material covered, and
encouraging clients to reflect on what works for them is intended
to encourage flexible control. In this context, flexible control
refers to the ability to move awareness up and down the control
system in order to meet valued goals.
Recurrent Intervention Components
As aforementioned, certain components are repeated
within the TCC. These components include exposure,
awareness/mindfulness, and metaphor/imagery. The PCT
basis of exposure, awareness/mindfulness is detailed below.
Although these components are found within other CBT
approaches, the PCT basis results in a specific way of utilizing
and framing these that is distinct from other approaches.
However, work is ongoing to examine the mediating eﬀects of
mechanisms according to PCT.
Imaginal Goal-Focused Exposure
According to PCT, exposure is perceptual and not behavioral.
This means that people attempt to keep the properties of their
experience (e.g., closeness, intensity) within a desired range using
dynamic changes in behavior (e.g., movement, using substances;
Brady and Raines, 2009; Carey, 2011). The proposed problem is
that people have conflicting perceptual goals; for example, the
conflict between avoiding a past memory of a distressing assault,
with the need to experience this memory to manage similar
situations in the future. This leads to loss of control as the person
oscillates from one goal to the other. According to PCT, exposure
is designed to help people hold this perceptual conflict in mind
and establish a new organization of goals (reorganization) that
allows them to regain overall control. The conflict between
personally relevant goals will be most emphasized if clients are
able to direct the exposure process (Brady and Raines, 2009),
with some guidance. Guided self-direction best promotes change,
because if pressure from the therapist is too great the client’s
awareness will be less directed to their underlying conflicted goals
(and more to the conflict created by the therapist’s pressure).
Therefore, in the TCC exposure is framed in such a way to
ensure it is self-directed, guided by client’s life goals and promotes
sustained attention on conflicts (Carey, 2011). Consequently,
it is described as “imaginal goal-focused exposure.” The way
in which the exercise is framed is always in the context of
important higher-level goals in order to promote awareness
of goal-conflict, instead of promoting habituation to anxiety,
emotional-processing, or reappraisal of a situation (e.g., Foa et al.,
2006). These outcomes may arise, but they are not seen as the
reason for exposure.
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The majority of empirical studies have found that greater
perceived control during exposure reduces anxiety and distress
levels; however, findings are not totally consistent (Mcglynn et al.,
1994; Rose et al., 1995). In one of the studies in which greater
perceived control did not reduce anxiety the average exposure
durations chosen by participants were very brief, which supports
the notion that some therapist direction is useful (Craske et al.,
1991). A number of theorists, such as Gray and McNaughton,
have highlighted the key role of goal conflict in activating an
anxiety response (e.g., Hirsh et al., 2012). A recent study, which
compared the performance of students with high and low levels
of spider phobia, found that high spider phobic individuals
responded in a way suggestive of goal conflict (Oliver and
Mansell, 2013).
Awareness/Mindfulness
From a PCT perspective, awareness is important in a number of
ways. It is important, that awareness of higher-level conflicted
goals that are causing psychopathology is encouraged, in order
to resolve these conflicts (Carey, 2011). According to PCT, the
primary reason for using awareness techniques is to develop
present moment awareness that can be brought to bear on
conflicted goals. Therefore awareness techniques used in the
TCC are shorter than those delivered in other approaches;
for example, MBCT (Fjorback et al., 2011). Use of awareness
techniques support clients to sustain attention on problematic
experiences indicative of goal conflict (e.g., during the imaginal
goal-focused exposure). It has been suggested that a range
of eﬀective therapies enable clients to sustain attention on
problem-relevant experiences for longer than would otherwise
occur (Carey, 2011). Through this sustained attention on such
experiences the individual’s perception is likely to become more
elaborate, and inherent conflicts more likely to be resolved.
It is also important that individuals are able to flexibly move
awareness through the control hierarchy in order to reduce
the likelihood of psychopathology and achieve long-term goals
(Watkins, 2011). Individual diﬀerences in the general level of
goal focusmaintain symptoms of a number of psychopathologies;
for example, a general focus on lower-level goals can lead
to greater impulsivity (Fujita and Carnevale, 2012). Emerging
research indicates that greater mindfulness is associated with
increased clarity regarding important goals and greater flexibility
of goal pursuit (Crane et al., 2010, 2012). Enhanced selective
and executive attention can be developed through short-term
meditation practice and may increase flexibility of awareness;
however, it is not clear whether the amount of practice during
the TCC would be suﬃcient (Chiesa et al., 2011). However, TCC
participants are provided with support to practice awareness
techniques at home if they choose to. Further, even very brief
mindfulness conditions have been shown to reduce reactivity to
repetitive thoughts (Levin et al., 2012).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Research at psychological process and neurobiological
levels indicates the promise of transdiagnostic accounts
in understanding and treating psychopathology (Nolen-
Hoeksema and Watkins, 2011; Morris and Cuthbert,
2012). PCT provides a functional transdiagnostic model
of how psychopathology arises and how recovery can be
facilitated.
There are other transdiagnostic models available. These
include Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2006), the
Self-Regulatory Executive Dysfunction (S-REF) model (Wells
and Matthews, 1996; Wells, 2007), and Interacting Cognitive
Subsystems (ICS; Barnard and Teasdale, 1991). It is beyond
the scope of this review to provide a detailed comparison of
these models (see Mansell et al., 2009, for a more detailed
account of this area). Establishing which model is the most
accurate will require ongoing empirical testing. Specifically it
would be useful to directly compare the purported mechanisms
of diﬀerent models in the same study. Further, there may be
diﬀerences in terminology within diﬀerent theories that obscure
conceptual similarities. For example, it could that the “process”
described as awareness, mindfulness and detached mindfulness
in diﬀerent theories refers to the same underlying process, and
that its benefits arise from similar mechanisms. Although it
is important to be precise and accurate in terminology, this
should not come at the cost of integrating potentially very similar
constructs.
Further research is required to directly test the relative
contribution of some of the PCT mechanisms predicted to
underlie psychopathology; for example, additional research
is required into whether higher-level conflict is a more
significant contributor to psychopathology than lower-level
conflict. Another important area will be examining the extent
to which the PCT basis of TCC facilitates its eﬀectiveness;
for example, the extent that the resolution of higher-level
goal conflict predicts successful exposure. This would facilitate
detailed comparison with other explanatory theories and
interventions.
In summary, this article has presented the theoretical basis
and design of a transdiagnostic intervention based on PCT.
While some components of this intervention could be familiar,
it is focused around the concept of control and based on the
premise that control is exercised at various levels for a human
being to continue living. Psychological distress is regarded as the
manifestation of loss of control, typically caused by prolonged
conflict between high-level goals. Therefore, change is promoted
by shifting awareness to this conflict and suﬃciently sustaining
awareness in order to allow spontaneous changes that resolve
the goal conflict and restore control. The TCC provides the tools
for individuals to apply these principles in an accessible, succinct
manner.
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